



THE SOLUTION TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA IS NOT EU OR NATO PROPAGANDA BUT ADVANCED SOCIAL SCIENCE TO UNDERSTAND AND MITIGATE ITS EFFECT IN TARGETED POPULATIONS



The Solution to Russian Propaganda is not EU or NATO Propaganda but Advanced Social Science to Understand and Mitigate its Effect in Targeted Populations

Cdr. (rtd) Steve Tatham, PhD

Russian Information Warfare officers must be having enormous fun at the moment. Unencumbered by the need to be truthful and attributable, mainstays of NATO communications, the depth, breadth and quality of many of the propaganda products being put out by Moscow suggests they may be experiencing none of the problems securing people, budgets or more importantly, the interest of their seniors in their work which besets western militaries and the NATO alliance. Whatever might be said about Russian foreign and military policy in Ukraine and the former soviet states, they cannot be accused of not taking Information Warfare seriously. The UK's Guardian newspaper recently exposed the activities of Savushkina 55 in St Petersburg, superficially a non-descript office block but inside home to round the clock teams of trolls reading and adding pro-Russian commentary to social media websites¹. Meanwhile RT, the far from independent Russian English language TV station, has posters up all over Piccadilly Circus, New York and Berlin²; the merest hint of any online anti-Russian sentiment is ruthlessly put down by armies of prowling trolls and worse, nearly 30,000km² of Ukrainian territory, Crimea, was captured using sophisticated hybrid warfare³ techniques where the conventional military 'hard power' (exemplified by the so-called 'Little Green Men') were merely supporting actors to the wider and more important information campaign. In Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Georgia aggressive Russian Information Operations is a daily challenge to policy makers.

An example is the YouTube video 'Why does the US need a big war in Europe'⁴. It is a slickly put together video with outstanding graphics, visual effects and multiple story lines. Themes include the Great Patriotic War, the humiliation of Russia in the 1990s, homophobia, racism, German aggression, who 'really' shot down MH-7, the US defence industrial complex, fascism and Russian nationalism. You may not like them all but there is 'something for everyone in the video', which is narrated by a smooth English voice highly reminiscent of a BBC news reporter.

¹ *Salutin' Putin: inside a Russian troll house*. The Guardian Newspaper 2 April 2015 available to download at:

² *RT's "Second Opinion" Ads Too Provocative For UK, Redacted*. PR newswire. 9 October 2014 available at: <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rts-second-opinion-ads-too-provocative-for-uk-redacted-278655331.html> accessed 19 May 2015.

³ Berzins Janis, *Russian New generation Warfare in the Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy*. Latvian National Defence Academy. April 2014 available online at: <http://www.naa.mil.lv/~media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx> accessed 7 July 2015

⁴ *Why does the U.S. need a big war in Europe* online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7PpdYil-7Y> accessed 7 July 2015.

Every international event is a potential opportunity to highlight Russian superiority and western impotence. For example, the earthquake which devastated the tiny, peaceful but desperately poor kingdom of Nepal. Some Latvian trekkers were caught up in it; unhurt, in good health and with food and water they contacted the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking to be evacuated. Perhaps not unreasonably the MFA advised them that as they were not in direct danger they were not a high priority. Perhaps also understandably this was not the answer they wanted and they vented their frustration on social media. Unfortunately this small and relatively trivial issue became an opportunity for Russian supporters to demonstrate how ‘uncaring’ the Latvian government was of its citizens⁵, contrasting with the response of Russian authorities to evacuate its people.

At least these events have a grain of truth at their core. So many other recent propaganda offerings do not and there are now plenty of examples in the public domain of the use of actors and actresses – Ms Galina Pyshniak, for example, seems to have a particularly traumatic war, witnessing multiple atrocities in different geographic areas. Or perhaps she has just had a succession of well paid acting roles.⁶ Images of death and destruction from Ukraine, and particularly human atrocities, appear legion although it is perhaps surprising how many owe their photographic genesis not to that particular war but instead to the Georgian conflict in 2008, Israeli actions in Gaza, the war in Syria and even Hollywood.⁷

In January of this year Twitter circulated what was portrayed as a leaked letter from the Swedish Defence Minister Peter Halqvist to BAe Systems Director Magnus Igesso, thanking him for showing off the archer missile system to Ukrainian colleagues.⁸ This is a sensitive issue for traditionally neutral Sweden but with strong leanings towards NATO. Sowing seeds of discontent within the Swedish population in its elected politicians, particularly with respect to Ukraine, would be helpful to Russia, keen to ensure Sweden’s continued neutrality. Halqvist issued an absolute statement that the letter was faked; by whom remains unknown although we may perhaps hazard an educated guess.

The minutes of a recent meeting held at the NATO Center of Excellence for Strategic Communication in Riga, Latvia, were also leaked to the ‘drakula blog’⁹ which in turn was picked up by, or possibly directly fed to, RT and Sputnik. Except that the minutes that were

⁵ *MFA does not help Nepal remaining Latvians* online at :

https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fnra.lv%2Flatvija%2F139549-am-nepalidz-nepala-palikusajiem-latviesiem.htm&edit-text= accessed 7 July 2015.

⁶ *Russian propaganda. She manages the sacrifice of Donbass*

<http://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=pl&u=http://swiat.newsweek.pl/galina-pyszniak-i-antyukrainska-propaganda-kremla,artykuly,355876,1.html&prev=search> accessed 7 July 2015

⁷ *Russia’s top lies about Ukraine. Part 3* online at <http://www.stopfake.org/en/russia-s-top-lies-about-ukraine-part-3/> accessed 7 July 2015.

⁸ *Sweden offers to sell weapons to Ukraine in the forged letter* online at:

http://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=sv&u=http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forfalskat-brev-pastar-att-sverige-ska-salja-vapen-till-ukraina_4353755.svd&prev=search

⁹ <https://drakulablogdotcom3.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/111.png> accessed 7 July 2015

leaked had been very subtly doctored. In the section on the challenges facing Ukraine an extra bullet point was added suggesting that a significant challenge was the growing popularity of the Russian leadership in south and east Ukraine. This had not been an issue discussed at the Centre and indeed a strong evidence base of research actually suggested that whilst the population in the east and south were not necessarily pro-Kiev supporters, neither were they fans of Moscow either; peace and stability were much more important to significant groups in eastern Ukrainian society. In their coverage of the leaked minutes RT, Sputnik and their acolytes predictably focused heavily on the invented bullet point.

Yet just because Sputnik and RT say it is so does not mean it is the truth. Dropped off at Riga airport by a Russian speaking Latvian taxi driver a few weeks ago the need for nuanced understanding was clearly demonstrated. We had exchanged a few pleasantries in Russian and he seemed a jovial fellow. Asked if he thought President Putin was good he looked over his shoulder at me, smiled and made a fist with his hand, enthusiastically moving it up and down: “*Putin Good – Putin Strong*”. But when asked if he thought President Putin should be President of Latvia his face changed dramatically and his big head shook emphatically. “*No, No. Putin bad for Latvia, bad for me*”.

And here is the rub. For all the propaganda, and there is a very great deal from both sides of the argument, what is its actual effect? The problem is that quantity does not necessarily mean quality – but sheer volume can be a persuasive metric in itself. The most interesting thing about the ‘Why the US wants war’ video is how few people have actually watched it. At the time of writing less than 140,000 people had watched it; compare this with Gangnam Style dance video which at 2 billion views is by far YouTube’s most watched video. So the key question is just how effective is this online stuff? According to the head of Communication services at NATO Headquarters, online and social media are the single most important way forward for all NATO outreach and all communications budgets should be focused on this. He points to the Arab Spring an example but even here there are conflicting views. Popular wisdom is that the Arab spring was a direct result of the accessibility of social media and yet there are 45 million Arab Facebook accounts and there were no revolutions in places such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. In fact when one looks back through history there have been seismic challenges to the *status quo* and all occurred without social media. The Berlin Wall managed to fall without Facebook; the Baltic Chain was linked together without Twitter. Social media is just another communication conduit and its effect on audiences is by no means certain. As the US Institute for Peace reported in a major study on the Arab spring: “*New Media did not appear to play a significant role in either in-country collective action, or regional diffusion during this period*”.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Blogs and Bullets II: New Media and Conflict after the Arab Spring* The US Institute for Peace. 10 July 2012. Available online at: <http://www.usip.org/publications/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-conflict-after-the-arab-spring> accessed 7 July 2015.

At the opening of the eight week Target Audience Analysis and counter-Propaganda course run by, amongst others, academics from the Behavioural Dynamics Institute¹¹ for NATO in Riga, Latvia¹², the Latvian State Secretary, Janis Sarts, told the assembled students and VIPs that we had enjoyed peace in Europe for twenty years but that we could not rely upon that to continue unless we began to better understand ‘people’. The word ‘understand’ is important; it is a word often used by senior policy makers and not in a supportive context. For example: “*Our experience in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly reinforce that lasting strategic results are only achieved by effectively influencing people Success depends on understanding the social fabric of the surroundings*”, General Ray Odierno US Army¹³; “*Strategic planning and execution should include continuous research and assessment to understand our audiences*” General Mungo Melvin UK Army; “*We also suffer from insufficiently understanding the culture and languages of our audiences*”, Mark Laity Head StratCom at SHAPE HQ.¹⁴ And here lies the real problem.

Our collective messaging tends not to be led not by an innate understanding of audiences but by creativity and follows the ideas of policy makers in Brussels, London and Washington. The principle is “This is the message - send it out”; invariably that message is crafted by European or North American men in suits sat behind a computer in an office. But one cannot help but wonder how that man in a suit knows what messages will resonate with the man in the dirty shalwar kameez in Pakistan, the miner in East Ukraine, the young Muslim ISIS fighter in Syria? The famous Roosevelt quote perhaps reminds us whose view is really the more important: “*the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood*”¹⁵. As the former UK media spokesman for the 2003 invasion of Iraq the incredulous looks of Iraqis being told of their new liberation, impending democracy and freedom told us that the messaging was no match for the reality. Freedom, they not unreasonably argued, did not come through US led occupation. So instead of western men in suits (and expensive PR companies) coming up with creative messages how much better would it be to ask: “*under what circumstances would an audience do [or not] do the following...*”. Or put another way, how about really understanding the behavioural motivations of an audience before addressing it rather than just sending it messages that we think it may like. This is what the Russians are very good at – they know which buttons to press with Russian populations. If we are to do this better then we need to look to science – not creativity.

Understanding individuals is hard; understudying groups is not, IF you know what to do. This may come as a surprise – particularly in the UK where two successive major political events have apparently been characterized by large groups not doing what was predicted.

¹¹ <http://www.bdinstitute.org>

¹² *Countering Propaganda: NATO Spearheads Use Of Behavioural Change Science* Online at: <http://www.stratcomcoe.org/lv/NewsandEvents/News/2015/5/12.aspx> accessed 7 July 2015.

¹³ *The Force of Tomorrow. The Army's Top General on the Future of War*. Foreign Policy Journal 4 February 2014 available online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/04/the-force-of-tomorrow/> accessed 19 May 2015.

¹⁴ NATO Strategic Communications Seminar, Latvia, Riga

¹⁵ Online at: <http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trsorbonnespeech.html>

The Scottish referendum on independence was apparently a 'dead certainty' for months – every poll showed that on the morning of 19 September 2014 Scotland would be independent from the rest of the UK. In the 2015 General election all of the polls showed that the two major parties were neck and neck and that neither would be able to form majority governments. The smaller parties would apparently hold the key to power. The voters, however, took a different view. By a substantial majority Scotland remained part of the UK and on the morning of 8 May 2015 the UK woke up to a majority conservative government. But not only were the polls wrong they were very badly wrong and they were way outside the allowable statistical margins of error. Without a hint of embarrassment or chagrin a leading pollster told the BBC that the “voters had not done what they had told Pollster would do”. So, simple then - it's the voter's fault. Michael Bruter, a political scientist who studies electoral psychology at the London School of Economics explains the problem: “the fact is that many people act differently when they are in the polling station”¹⁶

So we **CAN'T** predict group behaviours? Well 'yes' and 'no'. You certainly can't predict group behaviors from polls with any degree of confidence. Groups behave very differently to individuals and the problem with polls is that they aggregate individual response into group responses. They also presume that expressed opinion and attitudes are good indicators of behaviours. Both of these are risky assumptions; individuals behave differently in groups than as individuals – there are hundreds of studies to prove this - and attitudes are really weak precursors to behaviors. Once again years and years of social science research show this to be true. But make no mistake, social science research does allow us to predict group behaviours and to a verified and validated high degree of accuracy.

An example is Baghdad in 2006/7; a violent, chaotic, complex environment which for Iraqis was hell on earth. Sectarian killings, a humiliating occupation force, infrequent electricity supplies, interrupted water services and a break down in society. Unsurprising perhaps that there should be a reaction against it. There was – Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Between May-July 2007 the number of U.S. military deaths from IEDs soared to 203, accounting for 66% percent of all U.S. fatalities according to the Web site icasualties.org. Those numbers had climbed steadily from the same three-month period in 2004, when 54 Americans were killed by IEDs, 31% of total fatalities. Between July 2003 and July 2007 at least 1,509 Americans had been killed in Iraq by the makeshift roadside bombs, out of a total 3,707 fatalities (some 40%). The daily number of IED attacks had increased six-fold since 2003; On one day in May, 101 of the 139 anti-U.S. attacks involved IEDs. The problem to commanders, it seemed, was simple – people hated the US and particularly US values and therefore the 'solution' was to change their attitudes. An expensive PR led campaign was waged; iconic images of the US attempted to portray a softer and more friendly face for the US. Almost immediately the campaign yielded results – but not the right ones; the number of IED incidents went up.

¹⁶ Castelvocchi David, *Why the polls got the UK election wrong*. Nature – International Weekly Journal of Science 8 May 2015 online at: www.nature.com/news/why-the-fact-is-that-many-people-act-differently-when-they-are-in-the-polling-station-polls-got-the-uk-election-wrong-1.17511 accessed 27 July 2015.

However, using more sophisticated research instruments it was found that whilst the bomb layers were ideologically and implacably opposed to the US, and thus could not be moved, it was far less clear cut for those that made the IEDs. Indeed a vast majority were making them for one reason alone – money. They wanted money to move them and their families out of Iraq and the destination of choice was the USA. The PR campaign showed them iconic images of the US and they worked harder to achieve either objective. Thus the solution – and to be fair this was but one part of a full spectrum of counter-IED activities – was instead to show distressing images of dead and maimed Iraqi children and link them to IEDs. This was a message that resonated far more and the result, a reduction in IEDs.

Another example is HIV in the Caribbean. In the early 2000s AIDS was rampant in the Caribbean islands and if projection were right there was a real risk of the population dying out in 50 or 60 years. As a result a huge public information campaign was initiated to raise public awareness of the disease and the need for men to wear condoms. However young men in the Caribbean were overly blessed with a sense of ‘macho-ness’ – all were the atypical alpha male; condoms were seen as a sign of weakness, perhaps a sign that you already had a disease. In some extreme cases they were associated with homosexuality. It meant that men were simply unprepared to wear condoms. However, detailed TAA research revealed that the women had a deep-seated fear of out-of-wedlock pregnancies which were regarded as shameful. Thus the solution became simple. Women were encouraged to withhold their favours unless their partner wore a condom – the campaign being anchored not on AIDS but on birth control. It was a complete success.

Any serviceman who has spent time in Helmand will be aware of the story of the village and its Well. The men folk has asked the Provincial Reconstruction Team to sink them a Well. This was exactly the type of project the UK wanted to engage in and it was seen as a valuable contribution to the hearts and minds battle. The Well was duly sunk but within days had been poisoned. Returning to clean it the British were told it was the result of Taliban displeasure – although where they now were was a mystery. The Well was duly made serviceable but within days the same had happened. This time a more thorough analysis was undertaken – one that used science as its basis not hope or guess work. The results were a little different. Far from the Well being a unifier in the village it became obvious that a key constituent had not been consulted – the village women. Whilst they might moan and complain the daily 2-4 hour journey to collect water was undertaken as a group and was an opportunity for women to escape the village and have time with each other away from their men folk. In sinking a Well this small pleasure had been removed and they had poisoned it.

So what these examples show us is that the solutions to complex behaviours are seldom obvious and often counter-intuitive. Russian IO may in many instances be blatant lies and fabrications but it is generally well crafted and targets specific known vulnerabilities in societies. But targeting is not enough – we need to know how that translates into possible behaviors. In eastern Ukraine it is clear that there were significant rifts in society already but

how much can one attribute the civil war to the Russian propaganda machine and how much to dissatisfaction on the group with central government, with poor life changes, a stagnant economy and rampant corruption? Effective propaganda has to have something to work upon. It also has to resonate with its audience and here my Russian colleague do seem to know their audiences. The problem is we do not. In recent months there has been considerable discussion about the creation of a European Russian language TV station. My company was consulted and we offered the view that it looked much like a solution looking for a problem. How did we know that the grievances of Russian minorities in Latvia, Estonia *et al* would be addressed by a TV channel? What would its content be, what would be its editorial policy? The counter-argument is that audiences behind the iron curtain used to avidly listen to BBC word service, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. We pointed out that there was already a very well respected Russian language service offered by the BBC – one which had steadily lost audiences over the last few years. We also pointed out the disaster that has been Al-Hurra TV – the US' expensive efforts to broadcast to the Arab world and counter Arab TV stations such as Al-Jazeera. Despite the gloss and PR it has proven a weak tool of public diplomacy and whilst some of its programmes may hold interest its editorial line and ethos does not. A European based Russian language TV station may be the solution but in order to be sure you have to understand the audiences. It may just as equally be that the solution is improved economic rights, increased governmental capacity and accountability, the right to be registered as a citizen in the country in which you were born without having to pass a language test. In fact in detailed research my company undertook in Latvia in July 2015 it was clear that TV, of any providence, was simply not trusted by key audiences of interest who instead searched for their own news on trusted social media platforms.

The New York Times quotes one senior unnamed EU diplomat who explained the problems of declining support for the EU in Moldova: “*Moldovan pro-European politicians are very good at singing the European song to impress Brussels but in reality they have really mucked up discrediting both their own pro-European parties and the bloc itself.*”¹⁷ This is perhaps slightly unfair. The EU has been very good at issuing statements of condemnation and concern but less good at actually delivering on the ground. In the same article the mayor of Hincesti in Moldova points out that whilst his tone has been used as the ‘poster boy’ for EU projects more than half its residents still have no running water or modern sanitation; the Mayor – a self confessed EU supporter - tells the NYT that in his view Moldova would be better off joining President Putin’s custom’s union.

From this we can draw two conclusions. The first is that institutions are seldom willing to either see the need for or invest in proper research amongst target audiences to determine what the solution may be. Experience of nearly 30 years in the Information Operations business is that money is always available for implementation but rarely for the vital research

¹⁷ *Moldova Eyes Russia's Embrace as Flirtation With Europe Fades* The New York Times 21 May 2015 available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/world/europe/moldova-eyes-russias-embrace-as-flirtation-with-europe-fades.html?_r=0 accessed 7 July 2015.

that must pre-empt it. This was exactly the case with the EU's planning for a Russian language TV challenges. The European Fund for Endowment apologized but there simply was no money to undertake real research of the type needed to determine if a TV channel had any chance of success. On the rare occasions that funding has been committed to analysis and research, it has invariably been done too late, once the crisis is upon us, and more importantly concurrently with, or after, the initial policy response. This means that when the results are received, it is after the initial policy has been decided, and is not usually welcome as it inevitably highlights errors and omissions. And this links to the second problem - this type of research often provides uncomfortable findings often rarely linked to communications. The central truth of Strategic Communication is that words and deeds must match. No amount of glossy communication will cover up for a failure of deeds.

There are some positive actions that can be taken by the West but they require leadership, innovation and funding. Firstly, the EU, NATO and Western nations need to collaborate and find joint funding options for proper social science analysis and research of the issues confronting the 'frontier nations' before settling on apparent 'solutions'. There is already recognition that this needs to be done by places such as the NATO COE for Strategic Communication but they are woefully underfunded. Such research will undoubtedly reveal uncomfortable truths and thus, secondly, western Institutions need to be prepared for 'bad news'. As we see from politics in the UK, the value of the EU is far from clear to many Britons; almost certainly there is a real gap between the idea of the EU and its reality in many other nations and it will take courageous leadership to face up to such challenges. So too NATO. NATO regularly commissions surveys of its value and worth yet in the recent UK general election NATO in particular and defence in general featured not once in any of the public and party debates; NATO is simply not seen as being important when compared to every day practical realities such as health, education and commerce. NATO cannot be complacent. Thirdly, NATO is woefully unprepared to deal with Information Warfare challenges such as those presented by Putin. As a bureaucracy of 28 nations unanimity is inevitably a function of the lowest common denominator of agreement. Currently NATO StratCom is under resourced (with people), does not appear to enjoy the confidence of the military command structure in the way that more obvious military power does and is probably vested in the wrong part of NATO – namely in Public Diplomacy not the International Military Staff. It also seems distracted by an unhealthy focus on social media and reputation protection.

Linking StratCom to strategy, not just communications, particularly when it is underpinned by sound research, will be uncomfortable to conventional minds schooled in the old fashioned skills of intelligence and diplomacy. As we see in the current chess game with President Putin, Russia's view of international security is seemingly a zero sum game: 'we are secure when you are not'. Yet Western responses are linked to complex diplomatic negotiations where having a different, ambiguous, interpretation of the outcome is often the only way that 'consensus' can be achieved. Social science research such as that being taught at Riga demon-

strates that solutions exist amongst populations and that being talked to by diplomats in suits is a poor substitute for understanding. Back in 1967 Professor Richard Cottam, Professor of Political Science at Pittsburgh university published his book 'Competitive Interference and 20th Century Diplomacy'. He wrote: "*our diplomats and policy makers have been trained and experienced in the old style diplomacy and still adhere to its principles and speak its language; the discrepancy between understanding and practice leads to a hit or miss kind of foreign policy*".¹⁸ Putin is running competitive interference and we should at least be able to spot and counter it.

Finally, there needs to be a far greater acceptance of risk; decentralizing control, often to the point of discomfort, allows for far greater agility and speed of response – which as the BBC's Nik Gowing pointed out in his masterful '*Skyful of Lies and Black Swans*'¹⁹ speed being an absolutely key issue - but also presents greater risk. We need to see Policy makers and politicians shoulder risk with more comfort; to do so requires they have confidence in the staff, processes and organizations beneath them. Professionalizing key functions across great institutions is now vital and in this particular regard NATO's StratCom efforts are in particular need of attention. For example, a very subtle change to NATO's current communication ethos would have a disproportionate effect in thinking. Currently NATO "*communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives and missions*"²⁰. A small but necessary change should be: "*communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner to achieve its evolving roles, objectives and missions*"²¹

The problems confronting our world are so complex that radically different ideas are needed. All societies evolve, typically quicker during conflict than peace. But the world today is revolutionary not just evolutionary and we seem very far behind the curve in our ability as democracies to manage the problem. General Garasimov, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, has written of the need to have a permanent front operating inside other countries. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler wrote that '*Propaganda must rush on far in advance of organizations and win over the human material on which organization [sic] is to work*'.²² Both Hitler and Putin are (were) very good at propaganda. NATO and the EU are not but **nor do they need to be so**; the answer to propaganda is not more propaganda. The answer is to properly understand its effect and put in the place the necessary mitigation – which may not be communication - to extinguish its flames. This is much more than conventional human intelligence (HUMINT) or more general Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) – it is the development of a core Population Intelligence (POPINT) capability, one that is anchored in proven social sci-

¹⁸ Cottam Richard *Competitive Interference and 20th century Diplomacy* University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967

¹⁹ Gowing Nick, *Skyful of flies and black swans*. Reuter's Institute. 2009 Available to download at: <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Skyful%20of%20Lies%20%26%20Black%20Swans.%20The%20new%20tyranny%20of%20shifting%20information%20power%20in%20crises.pdf> accessed 7 July 2015.

²⁰ See *NATO Communications and Information programmes* online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69275.htm.

²¹ The author is grateful to Lt Cdr Simon Bedding RNR for his ideas in this area.

²² Hitler Adolf, *Mein Kampf*, Jaico Publishing House; 37th Jaico Impression 2007 edition.

ence, and it will require a significant investment in training ; the NATO STRATCOM Center course in Riga must be understood as the first stage of a longer and more comprehensive program.

About the author:

Dr. Steve Tatham served 26 years in the UK Armed Forces as an Information Operations expert. He holds a Ph.D in the use of Strategic Communication and Target Audience Analysis in mitigating future conflict and is the author of 'Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People's Motivations Will Prove decisive in Future Conflict'. He is Director of Operations at IOTA-Global Ltd, a specialist Information Operations training and advisory service and is an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research, National Defence Academy of Latvia.

Policy Paper n^o 04

April 2015

The views expressed here are solely those of the authors in their private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Latvian National Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence of Latvia, or any other entity of the Latvian government. It does not necessarily reflect the views of Her Majesty's Government either.